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Abstract—This paper provides a comprehensive review of
the domain of physical layer security in multiuser wireless
networks. The essential premise of physical layer security is to
enable the exchange of confidential messages over a wireless
medium in the presence of unauthorized eavesdroppers, with-
out relying on higher-layer encryption. This can be achieved
primarily in two ways: without the need for a secret key by
intelligently designing transmit coding strategies, or by exploiting
the wireless communication medium to develop secret keys over
public channels. The survey begins with an overview of the
foundations dating back to the pioneering work of Shannon and
Wyner on information-theoretic security. We then describe the
evolution of secure transmission strategies from point-to-point
channels to multiple-antenna systems, followed by generalizations
to multiuser broadcast, multiple-access, interference, and relay
networks. Secret-key generation and establishment protocols
based on physical layer mechanisms are subsequently covered.
Approaches for secrecy based on channel coding design are
then examined, along with a description of inter-disciplinary
approaches based on game theory and stochastic geometry. The
associated problem of physical layer message authentication is
also briefly introduced. The survey concludes with observations
on potential research directions in this area.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, Information-theoretic
security, wiretap channel, secrecy, artificial noise, cooperative
jamming, secret-key agreement
I. INTRODUCTION
The two fundamental characteristics of the wireless
medium, namely broadcast and superposition, present differ-
ent challenges in ensuring reliable and/or secure communi-
cations in the presence of adversarial users. The broadcast
nature of wireless communications makes it difficult to shield
transmitted signals from unintended recipients, while super-
position can lead to the overlapping of multiple signals at the
receiver. As a consequence, adversarial users are commonly
modeled either as (1) an unauthorized receiver that tries to
extract information from an ongoing transmission without
being detected, or (2) a malicious transmitter (jammer) that
tries to degrade the signal at the intended receiver [1]-[3].
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While jamming and counter-jamming physical layer strate-
gies have been of long-standing interest especially in military
networks, the security of data transmission has tradition-
ally been entrusted to key-based enciphering (cryptographic)
techniques at the network layer [4]. However, in dynamic
wireless networks this raises issues such as key distribution
for symmetric cryptosystems, and high computational com-
plexity of asymmetric cryptosystems. More importantly, all
cryptographic measures are based on the premise that it is
computationally infeasible for them to be deciphered without
knowledge of the secret key, which remains mathematically
unproven. Ciphers that were considered virtually unbreakable
in the past are continually surmounted due to the relentless
growth of computational power. Thus, the vulnerability shown
by many implemented cryptographic schemes [5]–[7], the lack
of a fundamental proof that establishes the difficulty of the
decryption problem faced by adversaries, and the potential
for transformative changes in computing motivate security
solutions that are provably unbreakable.
After some initial theoretical studies by Wyner and Maurer,
aspects of secrecy at the physical layer have experienced a
resurgence of interest only in the past decade or so. Therefore,
the remainder of this paper is devoted to surveying and
reviewing the various aspects of physical layer security in
modern wireless networks. The fundamental principle behind
physical layer security is to exploit the inherent randomness
of noise and communication channels to limit the amount
of information that can be extracted at the ‘bit’ level by
an unauthorized receiver. More importantly, no limitations
are assumed for the eavesdropper in terms of computational
resources or network parameter knowledge, and the achieved
security can be quantified precisely. With appropriately de-
signed coding and transmit precoding schemes in addition to
the exploitation of any available channel state information,
physical layer security schemes enable secret communication
over a wireless medium without the aid of an encryption
key. However, if it is desirable to use a secret key for
encryption, then information-theoretic security also describes
techniques that allow for the evolution of such a key over
wireless channels that are observable by the adversary. Thus,
information-theoretic security is now commonly accepted as
the strictest form of security. Additionally, since they can
operate essentially independently of the higher layers, physical
layer techniques can be used to augment already existing
security measures. Such a multilayered approach is expected
to significantly enhance the security of modern data networks,
whether wired or wireless.
2Instead of proceeding in a strictly chronological order, we
aim to provide a high-level overview of the historical devel-
opment of the field along with the most pertinent references,
juxtaposed with recent and ongoing research efforts. The
foundations of single and multi-antenna wiretap channels are
treated with some emphasis on the mathematical aspects, in
order to facilitate the understanding of advanced multi-user
networks. The term physical layer security will be used to
encompass both signal processing and information-theoretic
treatments of the topic.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In
the next section, the fundamental mathematical precepts of
secrecy are presented, along with a description of the most
elementary secrecy problem: the wiretap channel. The state-
of-the-art in the burgeoning area of multi-antenna wiretap
channels is described in Section III. The extension to more
than three terminals for broadcast, multiple-access, and inter-
ference channels is described in Section IV. The development
of secrecy in relay channels and other cooperative scenarios is
carried out in V. The important issue of secret-key generation
and agreement in wireless networks is studied in Section VI.
Section VII highlights the emerging areas of practical secu-
rity based on error-correcting codes. The penultimate section
covers cross-disciplinary approaches to secrecy based on game
theory and stochastic geometry, miscellaneous systems such as
sensor and cognitive radio networks, along with physical layer
message authentication. Finally, in Section IX we summarize
our discussion and provide a broad picture of future research
directions. Readers interested in going beyond the treatment
of physical layer security offered in this paper are referred to
the recent monographs [8]-[12].
II. FUNDAMENTALS
The simplest network where problems of secrecy and confi-
dentiality arise is a three-terminal system comprising a trans-
mitter, the intended (legitimate) receiver, and an unauthorized
receiver, wherein the transmitter wishes to communicate a
private message to the receiver. In the sequel, the unauthorized
receiver is referred to interchangeably as an eavesdropper
or wiretapper. The vast majority of physical layer security
research reviewed in this survey contains the premise that
the eavesdropper is passive, i.e., does not transmit in order
to conceal its presence. The knowledge available to the trans-
mitter regarding the eavesdropper’s channel state information
(CSI) plays a critical role in determining the corresponding
optimal transmission scheme. Due to uncertainties regarding
the location of eavesdroppers, this knowledge may range from
a complete lack of CSI, to partial and statistical CSI, and all
the way to complete CSI, as discussed in detail in the current
and next section. Furthermore, knowledge of the statistical
distributions of the eavesdropper spatial locations may also
be beneficial, as discussed further in Sec. VIII-C.
Encryption of messages via a secret key known only to
the transmitter and intended receiver has been the traditional
route to ensuring confidentiality. In the early 20th century,
the design of cryptographic methods was based on the notion
of computational security, without a solid mathematical basis
for secrecy. A classical example was Vernam’s one-time pad
cipher [13], where the binary message or plaintext is XOR’ed
with a random binary key of the same length.
A. Performance Metrics
Shannon postulated the information-theoretic foundations of
modern cryptography in his ground-breaking treatise of 1949
[14]. Shannon’s model assumed that a non-reusable private
key K is used to encrypt the confidential message M to
generate the cryptogram C, which is then transmitted over
a noiseless channel. The eavesdropper is assumed to have
unbounded computational power, knowledge of the transmit
coding scheme, and access to an identical copy of the signal
at the intended receiver. The notion of perfect secrecy was
introduced, which requires that the a posteriori probability of
the secret message computed by the eavesdropper based on
her received signal be equal to the a priori probability of the
message. In other words, perfect secrecy implies
I(M ;C) = 0, (1)
where I(·; ·) denotes mutual information. A by-product of this
analysis was that perfect secrecy [15] can be guaranteed only if
the secret key has at least as much entropy as the message to be
encrypted (generally equivalent to the key and plaintext being
of equal length [16]), i.e., H(K) ≥ H(M), which validated
Vernam’s one-time pad cipher system. In subsequent years,
it became common practice to use the nomenclature Alice,
Bob, and Eve to refer to the legitimate transmitter, intended
receiver, and unauthorized eavesdropper, respectively.
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Fig. 1: The wiretap channel of Wyner [17], where the eavesdropper’s
discrete memoryless channel is degraded relative to the main channel.
Wyner ushered in a new era in information-theoretic secu-
rity when he introduced the wiretap channel in [17], which
considered the imperfections introduced by the channel. Here,
the information signal X is transmitted to the intended re-
ceiver Bob over the ‘main channel’ which is modeled as a
discrete memoryless channel. The receiver observes Y , which
subsequently passes through an additional ‘wiretap channel’
before being received by the eavesdropper as Z , as shown in
Fig. 1.
Under the assumption that the source-wiretapper link is a
probabilistically degraded version of the main channel [16],
Wyner sought to maximize the transmission rate R in the main
channel while making negligible the amount of information
leaked to the wiretapper. More specifically, the transmitter
has a single message W , which is uniformly distributed over
{1, ..., 2nR}, where R is the rate of communication and n is
the block length of communication. The goal of the transmitter
is to deliverW reliably to the legitimate receiver while keeping
3it secure from the eavesdropper. In the classical work of [17],
for every ǫ > 0 it is required that
Re − ǫ ≤
1
n
H(W | Zn) (2)
for sufficiently large n, where Re represents the uncertainty
of message W or the equivocation at the eavesdropper [18].
The capacity-equivocation region is then the set of rate-
equivocation pairs (R , Re) that can be achieved by any coding
scheme.
It is noted that R − Re = 1n I(W ;Z
n) represents the
information that is leaked to the eavesdropper. Thus, when
the equivocation rate Re is arbitrarily close to the information
rate R, message W is asymptotically perfectly secure from the
eavesdropper, i.e., [18]
1
n
I(W ;Zn) ≤ ǫ . (3)
Under the asymptotic perfect secrecy constraint (3), the maxi-
mum rate of communicationR is called the secrecy capacity of
the wiretap channel. Also, it should be clear that the capacity
of the direct link, without secrecy constraints, is the maximum
rate R in the capacity-equivocation region regardless of the
value of Re and the secrecy constraint (2). This way, one
induces maximal equivocation at the wiretapper, and Wyner
was able to show that secure communication was possible
without the use of a secret key. Strictly speaking, Wyner’s
definition of “perfect secrecy” as the scenario in which the
block-length-normalized mutual information at the eavesdrop-
per vanishes in the limit of long block lengths was weaker
than that proposed by Shannon [cf. (1)], which requires that
the mutual information be zero regardless of the block length
and is also known as strong secrecy [20].
More recently, the study of secrecy in fading channels has
led to the use of outage probability performance metrics. Out-
age metrics for physical layer security are defined analogously
to the conventional rate outage metrics, for e.g., the secrecy
outage probability is the likelihood that the instantaneous
secrecy rate Rs is below a pre-defined threshold ε for a
particular fading distribution [19]:
Pout = Pr {Rs < ε} , ε > 0.
Furthermore, security approaches based on signal processing
methods often make use of more traditional performance
metrics by designing transmission schemes that restrict the
bit error rate (BER) or signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
(SINR) at eavesdroppers to pre-defined thresholds. Note that
constraining the BER or SINR at eavesdroppers does not
satisfy either weak or strong secrecy requirements, but can
often simplify system design.
In 1993, Maurer [21] presented a strategy that allowed a
positive rate even when the wiretapper observes a “better”
channel than the one used by the legitimate users. The essence
of Maurer’s scheme was the joint development of a secret
key by the transmitter and receiver via communication over a
public (insecure) and error-free feedback channel. Thereafter,
research in information-theoretic secrecy developed along two
main branches: secret key-based secrecy as in the work by
Shannon and Maurer, and keyless security as in the work by
Wyner. In Section II-B to Section V we trace the evolution of
keyless security over the past four decades. We revisit the topic
of key-based security for wireless channels in Section VI.
B. Single-Antenna Wiretap Channels Since Wyner
Early work in the field generally assumed non-fading chan-
nels, and knowledge of the (fixed) channel state was presumed
at the transmitter. In [22], bounds on the equivocation rate
for Wyner’s wiretap channel model with finite code block
lengths are derived. Carleial and Hellman [23] considered
a special case of Wyner’s model where the main channel
is noiseless and the wiretap channel is a binary symmetric
channel, and analyzed the applicability of systematic linear
codes for preserving the secrecy of an arbitrary portion of the
transmitted message. For the degraded wiretap channel [24]
with additive Gaussian noise, and CM and CW as the Shannon
capacities of the main and wiretap channels, the essential result
for the secrecy capacity CS was the following:
CS = CM − CW . (4)
Ultimately, it was established that a non-zero secrecy capacity
can only be obtained if the eavesdropper’s channel is of lower
quality than that of the intended recipient.
Csisza`r and Ko¨rner considered a more general (non-
degraded) version of Wyner’s wiretap channel in [25], where
they obtained a single-letter characterization of the achievable
{private message rate, equivocation rate, common message
rate}-triple for a two-receiver broadcast channel. For the
special case of no common messages, the secrecy capacity
was defined as
CS = max
V→X→Y Z
I (V ;Y )− I (V ;Z) , (5)
which is achieved by maximizing over all joint probability
distributions such that a Markov chain V,X, Y Z is formed,
where V is an auxiliary input variable. In [26] it was shown
that the availability of non-causal side information at the
encoder can enhance the achievable secrecy rate region of (5),
based on dirty-paper coding arguments.
In [27], Ozarow and Wyner studied the type-II wiretap
channel, where the main communication channel is noiseless
but the wiretapper has access to an arbitrary subset µ of the
N coded bits, and optimal tradeoffs between code rate k/N
and µ that guaranteed secrecy were characterized.
The consideration of channel fading in wiretap channels has
recently opened new avenues of research. Works in this area
generally assume that at least the statistics of the eavesdrop-
per’s fading channel are known to the transmitter. Barros and
Rodrigues et al. [19]-[28] analyzed the outage probability and
outage secrecy capacity of slow fading channels and showed
that with fading, information-theoretic security is achievable
even when the eavesdropper has a better average SNR than
the legitimate receiver.
Li et al. [29] examined the achievable secrecy rate for
an AWGN main channel and a Rayleigh fading eavesdrop-
per’s channel with additive Gaussian noise, assuming that the
eavesdropper channel realizations are unknown to legitimate
transmitter Alice and receiver Bob. The main result of this
4paper was that with Gaussian random codes, artificial noise
injection and power bursting, a positive secrecy rate is achiev-
able even when the main channel is arbitrarily worse than the
eavesdropper’s average channel. A more exotic scenario was
studied in [30] where the source has a stochastic power supply
based on energy harvesting. Here, the i.i.d. energy arrivals are
equated to channel states that are known causally to the source,
and the optimal input distribution that attains the boundary
of the capacity-equivocation region of the Gaussian wiretap
channel was derived. Here, the capacity corresponds to the
reliability of the main channel, while the equivocation refers
to the normalized conditional entropy at the eavesdropper as
described in Sec. II.
Relatively fewer studies consider the case of a complete
absence of eavesdropper CSI at the transmitter in fading
wiretap channels. In [31], the authors considered a block-
fading scalar wiretap channel where the number of channel
uses within each coherence interval is large enough to invoke
random coding arguments. This assumption is critical for
their achievable coding scheme which attempts to “hide”
the secure message across different fading states. A recent
approach towards understanding the information-theoretic lim-
its of wiretap channels with no eavesdropper CSI has been
taken by studying the compound wiretap channel [32]. The
compound wiretap channel captures the situation in which
there is no or incomplete CSI at the transmitter by assuming
the eavesdropper’s channel is always drawn from a finite,
known set of states, and guarantees secure communication
under any state that may occur.
III. MULTI-ANTENNA CHANNELS
The explosion of interest in multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) systems soon led to the realization that exploiting the
available spatial dimensions could also enhance the secrecy
capabilities of wireless channels. In a fading MIMO channel
where the transmitter, receiver, and eavesdropper are equipped
with NT , NR, NE antennas respectively as in Fig. 2, a gen-
eral representation for the signals received by the legitimate
receiver and passive eavesdropper are
yb = Hbxa + nb
ye = Hexa + ne,
(6)
where xa ∈ CNT×1 is the transmit signal with covariance
matrix E
{
xax
H
a
}
= Qx, average power constraint Tr (Qx) ≤
P , Hb ∈ C
NR×NT ,He ∈ C
NE×NT are the MIMO complex
Gaussian channel matrices, and nb,ne are zero-mean complex
white Gaussian additive noise vectors.
The work by Hero [33] was arguably the first to consider
secret communication in a MIMO setting, and sparked a
concerted effort to apply and extend the single-antenna wiretap
theory to this new problem. Hero examined the utility of
space-time block coding for covert communications in [33],
and designed CSI-informed transmission strategies to achieve
either a low probability of intercept (defined in terms of
eavesdropper mutual information), or a low probability of
detection for various assumptions about the CSI available to
the eavesdropper. One of the main results was that if the
TX
(Alice)
RX
(Bob)
Eve
Nt Nr
Ne
Fig. 2: General MIMO wiretap channel.
eavesdropper is completely unaware of its receive CSI, then
an equivocation-maximizing strategy is to employ a space-time
constellation with a constant spatial inner product.
Parada and Blahut analyzed a degraded single-input
multiple-output (SIMO; NT = 1, NR, NE > 1) wiretap
channel in [34], and obtained a single-letter characterization
of its secrecy capacity by transforming the problem to a
scalar Gaussian wiretap channel and then re-applying (4).
The authors also proposed a secrecy rate outage metric for
the SIMO wiretap channel with slow fading, and observed
a secrecy diversity gain of order proportional to the number
of receiver antennas. The corresponding multiple-input single-
output (MISO) case was studied in [35], [36], where it was
noted that the MIMO wiretap channel is not degraded in
general. Since this renders a direct computation of (5) difficult,
they therefore restricted attention to Gaussian input signals.
For the special case of NT = 2, NR = 2, NE = 1 analyzed
by Shafiee and coworkers in [37], a beamforming transmission
strategy was shown to be optimal.
The next steps toward understanding the full-fledged MIMO
wiretap channel were taken in [38]-[41], which considered
the case of multiple antennas at all nodes and termed
it the MIMOME (multiple-input multiple-output multiple-
eavesdropper) channel. Khisti et al. [38] developed a genie-
aided upper bound for the MIMO secrecy capacity for which
Gaussian inputs are optimal. When the eavesdropper’s in-
stantaneous channel state is known at the transmitter, it was
shown that an asymptotically optimal (high SNR) scheme is to
apply a transmit precoder based upon the generalized singular
value decomposition (GSVD) of the pencil (Hb,He), which
decomposes the system into parallel channels and leads to a
closed-form secrecy rate expression. For the so-called MIS-
OME special case where NR = 1, NT , NE > 1, the optimal
transmit beamformer is obtained as the generalized eigenvector
ψm corresponding to the largest generalized eigenvalue λm of
hHb hbψm = λmH
H
e Heψm.
If only the statistics of He are known to the transmitter, then
the authors proposed an artificial noise (AN) injection strategy
as first suggested by Goel and Negi [40], [41]. The artificial
noise is transmitted in conjunction with the information signal,
and is designed to be orthogonal to the intended receiver, such
that only the eavesdropper suffers a degradation in channel
quality [42], [43]. The transmit signal can be represented in
5general as
xa = Taza +Tnzn (7)
where precoding matrices Ta ∈ CNT×NT−d and Tn ∈
CNT×d correspond to data and AN signal vectors za ∈
C
NT−d×1
, zn ∈ C
d×1
, respectively. When NT > NR, Tn can
be formed from the nullspace of Hb, otherwise Tn and Ta can
be chosen to guarantee received signals in orthogonal spaces
by forming them from the right singular vectors of Hb [44]. If
the eavesdropper’s CSIT is partially known, additional gains
may be achieved by optimizing the AN transmit covariance
[45] or relaxing the orthogonality constraint [46]. As will
be seen in the rest of the survey, the use of artificial noise
is a recurring theme for secrecy in many different multiuser
networks.
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Fig. 3: The MIMO secrecy rates of GSVD-beamforming [42], [61],
artificial noise [41], and waterfilling over the main channel, NT =
NE = 3, NR = 2. Transmit power is in dB, assuming 0dB noise
power.
An example of the secrecy rate performance of various
transmission strategies for the MIMO wiretap channel is
shown in Fig. 3. The GSVD scheme requires instantaneous
knowledge of eavesdropper channel He, the artificial noise
scheme requires the statistics of He, and the relatively poor
performance of waterfilling on the main channel is also shown
when no information is available regarding He.
The MIMO wiretap channel was studied independently by
Oggier and Hassibi [39], who computed a similar upper bound
on the MIMO secrecy capacity, and showed after a matrix
optimization analysis that
CS = max
Qx0
log det
(
I+HbQxH
H
b
)
−log det
(
I+HeQxH
H
e
)
.
(8)
In [47], Liu and Shamai reexamine the MIMO wiretap channel
with a more general matrix input power-covariance constraint
Qx  S, and showed that the conjecture of a Gaussian
input U = X without prefix coding is indeed an optimal
secrecy capacity-achieving choice. Zhang et al. attempt to
bypass the non-convex optimization of the optimal input
covariance matrix by drawing connections to a sequence of
convex cognitive radio transmission problems, and obtained
upper and lower bounds on the MIMO secrecy capacity [48].
Li and Petropulu [49] computed the optimal input covariance
matrix for a MISO wiretap channel, and presented a set of
equations characterizing the general MIMO solution.
Bustin and coauthors [50] exploited the fundamental rela-
tionship between mean-squared error and mutual information
to provide a closed-form expression for the optimal input co-
variance Qx that achieves the MIMO wiretap channel secrecy
capacity, again under an input power-covariance constraint.
More precisely, it was shown in [50] that, under the matrix
power constraint Qx  S, the solution of (6) is given by
Csec(S) =
λ∑
i=1
logαi (9)
where αi, i = 1, . . . , λ, are the generalized eigenvalues of the
pencil
(S
1
2HHb HbS
1
2 + I, S 12HHe HeS
1
2 + I) (10)
that are greater than 1. Note that, since both elements of the
pencil (10) are strictly positive definite, all the generalized
eigenvalues of the pencil (10) have real positive values [51],
[52]. In (9), a total of λ of them are assumed to be greater
than 1. Clearly, if there are no such eigenvalues, then the
information signal received at the intended receiver is a
degraded version of that of the eavesdropper, and in this case
the secrecy capacity is zero.
It should be noted that, under the average power constraint
Tr (Qx) ≤ P , there is no computable secrecy capacity
expression for the general MIMO case. In fact, for the average
power constraint, the secrecy capacity would in principle be
found through an exhaustive search over the set {S : S 
0,Tr(S) ≤ P}. More precisely, we have [51], [83, Lemma 1]
Csec(P ) = max
S0,Tr(S)≤P
Csec(S) (11)
where, for any given semidefinite S, Csec(S) can be computed
as given by (9). A closed-form solution is possible in certain
special cases, for example when S is known to be full rank
[53], [54], or in the high-SNR regime based on the GSVD
[42] as described previously.
Subsequently, numerous research contributions emerged
that considered a number of practical issues regarding the
MISO/MIMO wiretap channel [56], of which we enumerate a
few below:
• Optimal power allocation and beamforming methods for
the artificial noise strategy were presented in [57], for
the MISO scenario in [58]–[60], and for the GSVD-based
precoding scheme in [61].
• If even statistical information regarding the eavesdrop-
per’s channel is unavailable, then Swindlehurst et al. [44],
[55] suggested an approach where just enough power is
allocated to meet a target performance criterion (SNR or
rate) at the receiver, and any remaining power is used for
broadcasting artificial noise, since the secrecy rate cannot
be computed at the transmitter. A compound wiretap
channel approach and a resultant universal coding scheme
that guarantees a positive secrecy rate was presented in
[70].
6• The effects of imperfect and quantized CSIT of the
main (Alice-to-Bob) channel upon the secrecy rate were
examined in [62] and [63], respectively, while bounds on
secrecy capacity with imperfect CSIT and limited ARQ
feedback were given in [64], [65]. MIMOME secrecy
rate maximization with imperfect CSIT of all channels
was solved using an iterative algorithm in [66] via a
Taylor series expansion to convexify the secrecy rate. Dis-
criminatory training methods that include artificial noise
for acquisition of main channel CSI while degrading the
eavesdropper’s estimate of He were analyzed in [67].
• Precoding and receive filter designs to minimize the
mean-square error (MSE) at Bob while constraining the
MSE at Eve to be above some threshold were given in
[68]. Non-linear precoding based on lattices or vector-
perturbation ideas with eavesdropper error probability as
the metric was examined in [69].
• MIMO secrecy capacity has also been studied for OFDM-
based frequency-selective channels [71], [72], Rician
fading channels [73], and ergodic [74] channel fading
processes. The secrecy outage probability of maximum
ratio combining was presented in [75] and of transmit
antenna selection in [76]-[78].
• Detection-theoretic methods for discerning the presence
of a completely passive eavesdropper based on its local
oscillator leakage power were analyzed in [79].
• An evolved full-duplex eavesdropper that can divide its
antenna array into sub-arrays for simultaneous eavesdrop-
ping and jamming was considered in [80].
A summary of transmission strategies in the MIMO wiretap
channel for various assumptions regarding eavesdropper chan-
nel state information at the transmitter (ECSIT) is presented
in Table I.
TABLE I: Comparison of MIMO wiretap transmission strategies for
various ECSIT assumptions
Parameters Strategy Criterion
MIMOME, no ECSIT [44] Artif. noise Meet rate target
MIMOME, statistical ECSIT [41] Artif. noise Ergodic secrecy rate
MISOME, complete ECSIT [42] GEVD Secrecy rate
MIMOME, complete ECSIT [43] GSVD Secrecy rate
IV. BROADCAST, MULTIPLE-ACCESS, AND INTERFERENCE
CHANNELS
A. Broadcast and Multiple-Access Channels
The concept of information-theoretic security is easily ex-
tended to larger multi-user networks with more than two
receivers and/or transmitters. We begin with one-to-many
broadcast channels (BCs), which can be divided into two major
categories from a security perspective:
1) BC with confidential messages: each downlink message
must be kept confidential from all other unintended
receivers, i.e., each receiver is seen as an eavesdropper
for messages not intended for it.
2) Wiretap BC: messages do not need to be mutually
confidential among the downlink receivers, but must be
protected from external eavesdroppers.
The former case is more challenging than the latter, for which
the existing transmission techniques of Sec. III can mostly
be reused. Therefore, unless stated otherwise the following
discussion will assume the first category.
The original wiretap channel as proposed by Wyner [17],
is a form of broadcast channel (BC) where the source sends
confidential messages to the destination, and attempts to keep
the messages as secret as possible from the other receiver(s)/
eavesdropper(s). Csisza`r and Ko¨rner extended this work to
the case where the source sends common information to
both the destination and the eavesdropper, and confidential
messages are sent only to the destination [25]. The secrecy
capacity region of this scenario, for the case of a BC with
parallel independent subchannels, was considered in [81]
and the optimal source power allocation that achieves the
boundary of the secrecy capacity region was derived. The
secrecy capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian broadcast
channel with common message to both the destination and
the eavesdropper, and confidential message sent only to the
destination, was characterized in [82] using a channel en-
hancement approach [83] and under the matrix input power-
covariance constraint Qx  S. The notion of an enhanced
broadcast channel was first introduced in [83] and was used
jointly with the entropy power inequality to characterize the
capacity region of the conventional Gaussian MIMO broadcast
channel (without secrecy constraint). Most of the current work
in the literature on secrecy for the MIMO broadcast channel
uses this idea. Moreover, instead of the average total power
constraint Tr (Qx) ≤ P , they considered the matrix input
power-covariance constraint Qx  S.
The discrete memoryless broadcast channel with two con-
fidential messages sent to two receivers, where each receiver
acts as an eavesdropper for the other, was studied in [84],
where inner and outer bounds for the secrecy capacity region
were established. This problem was studied in [85] for the
MISO Gaussian case and in [51] for the general MIMO
Gaussian case. Rather surprisingly, it was shown in [51]
that, under the matrix input power-covariance constraint, both
confidential messages can be simultaneously communicated at
their respected maximum secrecy rates, where the achievability
was obtained using dirty-paper coding. To prove this result,
Liu et al. revisited the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel and
showed that a coding scheme that uses artificial noise and
random binning achieves the secrecy capacity of the MIMO
Gaussian wiretap channel as well [51].
Consider the broadcast channel represented by (4) and (5),
with the addition of independent confidential messages W1
(intended for receiver 1 but needed to be kept secret from
receiver 2) and W2 (intended for receiver 2 but needed to be
kept secret from receiver 1). From [51, Corollary 2], under
the matrix constraint S, the secrecy capacity region is given
by the set of nonnegative rate pairs (R1, R2) such that
R1 ≤
λ∑
i=1
logαi; R2 ≤
NT−λ∑
j=1
log
1
βj
(12)
where αi, i = 1, . . . , λ, are the generalized eigenvalues of the
pencil (10) that are bigger than 1, and βj j = 1, . . . ,(NT −λ)
7are those that are less than or equal to 1.
The secrecy capacity region of MIMO Gaussian broadcast
channels with confidential and common messages, where the
transmitter has two independent confidential messages and a
common message, was characterized in [86]. The achievabil-
ity was obtained using secret dirty-paper coding, while the
converse was proved by using the notion of channel splitting
[86]. Secure broadcasting with more than two receivers was
considered in [87]–[90] (and references therein). These papers
assume one transmitter intends to communicate with several
legitimate users in the presence of an external eavesdropper.
The secrecy capacity region for the case of two legitimate
receivers was characterized by Khandani et al. [88] using
enhanced channels, and for an arbitrary number of legiti-
mate receivers by Ekrem et al. [89]. Ekrem et al. use the
relationships between minimum-mean-square-error and mutual
information, and equivalently, the relationships between Fisher
information and differential entropy to provide the converse
proof. In [90], Liu et al. considered the secrecy capacity
regions of the degraded Gaussian MIMO BC with layered
confidential messages, where each message must be kept secret
from different subsets of receivers. They presented a vector
generalization of Costa’s Entropy Power Inequality to provide
their converse proof. Chia and El Gamal provided inner and
outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region of the three-
receiver BC with one common and one confidential message
in [91], and the extension to additional layered message sets
was studied in [92]. The role of artificial noise for jamming
eavesdroppers in wiretap broadcast channels was investigated
in [93]–[95].
For the average transmit power constraint Tr (Qx) ≤ P , a
computable secrecy capacity expression is currently unavail-
able for the general MIMO broadcast channel case. However,
optimal solutions based on linear precoding have been found.
For example, in [96], a linear precoding scheme was proposed
for a general MIMO BC under the matrix covariance con-
straint. Conditions were derived under which the proposed
linear precoding approach is optimal and achieves the same
secrecy rate region as S-DPC. This result was then used to
derive a closed-form sub-optimal algorithm based on linear
precoding for an average power constraint. In [97], GSVD-
based beamforming was used for the MIMO Gaussian BC
to simultaneously diagonalize the channels. Linear precoding
based on regularized channel inversion was studied in [98]–
[100] for a multi-antenna downlink where each message must
be kept confidential from unintended receivers, and additional
external eavesdroppers were assumed present in [101]. User
selection in downlink channels with external eavesdroppers
was studied in [102]–[107].
Other recent work on secure multi-user communications
investigate the multiple-access channel (MAC) with confiden-
tial messages [108], [109], the MAC wiretap channel (MAC-
WT) [110], [111], and the cognitive MAC with confidential
messages [113]. In [108] and [109], two transmitters commu-
nicating with a common receiver try to keep their messages
secret from each other. For this scenario, the achievable
secrecy rate region, and the capacity region for some special
cases, are considered.
In [110], the Gaussian multiple access wire-tap channel
(GMAC-WT) was considered, where multiple users are trans-
mitting to a base station in the presence an eavesdropper that
receives a noisy version of what is received at the base station
(degraded wiretapper). In [110], achievable rate regions were
found for different secrecy constraints, and it was shown that
the secrecy sum capacity can be achieved using Gaussian
inputs and stochastic encoders. In [111], [112], a general,
not necessarily degraded, Gaussian MAC-WT was considered,
and the optimal transmit power allocation that achieves the
maximum secrecy sum-rate was obtained. It was shown in
[111] that, a user that is prevented from transmitting based on
the obtained power allocation can help increase the secrecy
rate for other users by transmitting artificial noise to the
eavesdropper.
In [113], Liu et al. considered the fading cognitive multiple-
access channel with confidential messages (CMAC-CM),
where two users attempt to transmit common information to
a destination while user 1 also has confidential information
intended for the destination and tries to keep its confidential
messages as secret as possible from user 2. The secrecy
capacity region of the parallel CMAC-CM was established and
the closed-form power allocation that achieves every boundary
point of the secrecy capacity region was derived [113]. It
should be noted that all the above work on the MAC with
confidential messages assumes single antenna nodes, with little
existing work on multiple-antenna scenarios.
B. Interference Channel
The interference channel (IFC) refers to the case where
multiple communication links are simultaneously active in the
same time and frequency slot, and hence potentially interfere
with each other. The IC is generally considered to be the
antithesis of a cooperative network, since each transmitter is
interested only in selfishly maximizing its own rate, and its
message acts as interference to all other links. In conventional
IFCs it is generally assumed that each receiver treats the
interference from unintended transmitters as noise, but under
secrecy constraints this assumption can no longer be made.
A special application of the IFC with secrecy constraints is
addressed in [114], where the message from only one of the
transmitters was considered confidential. The more general
case, where each receiver acts as an eavesdropper for the
other transmitter, was studied in [84] where, in the absence
of a common message, the authors imposed a perfect secrecy
constraint and obtained inner and outer bounds for the perfect
secrecy capacity region. In [115], the authors analyzed the
optimal location of an external eavesdropper so as to drive
the secrecy rate of all links to zero, where location is defined
logically in terms of channel gains.
Since in most multi-user scenarios it is difficult to obtain the
exact secrecy capacity region, there has been recent interest
in studying the asymptotic performance of these systems in
the high SNR regime. For such networks, a useful metric that
captures the scaling behavior of the sum secrecy rate RΣ as
the transmit SNR, ρ, goes to infinity is the number of secure
8degrees of freedom (SDoF), which can be defined as
η , lim
ρ→∞
RΣ (ρ)
log (ρ)
.
The SDoF of various multiuser networks described in Sec-
tions IV-V are summarized in Table II, and generally rely upon
the principle of interference alignment (IA) for achievability
[116]. For example, the number of secure DoF for K-user
Gaussian IFCs (K ≥ 3) has been addressed in [117], [118],
[119], and it was shown that under very strong interference,
positive secure DoFs are achievable via IA and channel exten-
sion. The (K × L) X network comprises K transmitters that
each wish to communicate with L receivers, and each of the
receivers wishes to receive messages from all K transmitters,
and the SDoF is achieved via random binning and IA [122].
TABLE II: Secure degrees of freedom in multiuser networks.
Network Secure DoF
K-user SISO IFC, confidential messages [117] η = K−2
2K−2
K-user SISO IFC, external Eve [117] η = K−2
2K
K-user SISO MAC, external Eve [120] η = K(K−1)
K(K−1)+1
K-helper SISO wiretap, external Eve [121] η = K
K+1
(K × L) X network, confidential messages [122] η = L(K−1)
K+L−1
It should be noted that all of the above references [114]-
[119] assume single antenna nodes. The more limited set of
work that considers the impact of multi-antenna nodes on
secrecy in the interference channel include [123]-[125]. In
[123], Jorswieck et al. studied the achievable secrecy rates of a
two-user MISO interference channel, where each receiver has
a single antenna. They modeled a non-cooperative game in the
MISO interference channel and obtained the Nash equilibrium
point using an iterative algorithm. A more unusual formulation
was adapted in [126], where a closed-form solution for the
NE point was obtained where each multi-antenna transmitter
desires to maximize the difference between its secrecy rate
and the secrecy rate of the other link.
In [124] and [125], Swindlehurst et al. investigated the two-
user MIMO Gaussian interference channel with confidential
messages, where each node has arbitrary number of antennas.
Several cooperative and non-cooperative transmission schemes
were described, and their achievable secrecy rate regions were
derived. A game-theoretic formulation of the problem was
adopted to allow the transmitters to find an operating point
that balances network performance and fairness (the so called
Kalai-Smorodinsky (K-S) bargaining solution [125]). If the
transmitters cooperate by exchanging information about the
channels and signal subspaces associated with their link, then
a combination of GSVD beamforming and altruistic artificial
noise alignment by each transmitter to mask the information
signal from the other transmitter at its own receiver can be
used, as seen in Fig. 4. As depicted in the figure, each
transmitter intentionally undermines the ability of its receiver
to decode the interfering signal; for example, noise H1A1 and
interference G2D2 are aligned to lie in the same subspace
at receiver 1. Here, the artificial noise can potentially also
degrade the confidential message of the transmitter itself, so
the transmit signal and power allocated to noise must be
carefully designed. It was shown in [125] that, while ordinary
jamming is near optimal for the standard wiretap channel
[43], its performance is far from optimal for the interference
channel. Fig. 4 shows the achievable secrecy rate regions of
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Fig. 4: The cooperative ANA principle in the 2-user MIMO inter-
ference channel, and the corresponding secrecy rate region with and
without cooperation.
the proposed schemes in [125] with 2 antennas at source 1,
3 antennas at all other nodes, and a transmit SNR of 20
dB, along with the Nash equilibrium (NE) from the non-
cooperative GSVD approach, and the clearly superior K-S rate
point for the cooperative GSVD and artificial noise alignment
method.
V. RELAYS AND COOPERATIVE METHODS
The issue of physical layer security in relay and coop-
erative networks has drawn much attention recently, as a
natural extension to the secure transmission problem in non-
cooperative networks. The secrecy capacity and achievable
secrecy rate bounds have been investigated for various types of
relay-eavesdropper channels, and many cooperative strategies
stemming from conventional relay systems have been adopted
with modifications based on techniques discussed in Sec. III,
as shown in Fig. 6. Security issues in relay networks can be
divided into two broad categories:
• Relays are untrusted nodes from whom the transmitted
messages must be kept confidential even while using them
to relay those messages,
• Relays are trusted nodes from whom the transmitted
messages need not be kept secret.
A. Untrusted Relays
As a pessimistic assumption, the relay itself can be consid-
ered to be an untrusted user that acts both as an eavesdropper
and a helper, i.e., the eavesdropper is co-located with the relay
node as shown in Fig. 5. The source desires to use the relay
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Fig. 5: Representations of trusted (distinct relay and eavesdropper)
and untrusted (co-located relay and eavesdropper) relay networks.
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(c) Two-way relay-aided secret key exchange based on analog network
coding.
Fig. 6: Relay-aided cooperative approaches for physical layer security
with an external eavesdropper.
to communicate with the destination, but at the same time
intends to shield the message from the relay. This type of
model was first studied in [128] for the general relay channel.
Coding problems associated with the relay-wiretap channel
are studied under the assumption that some of transmitted
messages are confidential to the relay, and deterministic and
stochastic rate regions are explicitly derived in [129]–[131],
which showed that cooperation from the untrusted relay is
still essential for achieving a non-zero secrecy rate. In [129],
an achievable region of rate pairs (R1, Re) was derived for
the general untrusted relay channel.
Based on this region, the cooperation of an untrusted relay
node was found to be beneficial for a specific model where
there is an orthogonal link in the second hop. Cooperative relay
broadcast channels are discussed in [132], where the users
are untrusted but not malicious. In such scenarios, users are
willing to help each other, but would not be allowed to decode
each other’s message. Assuming a half-duplex amplify-and-
forward protocol, another effective countermeasure in this case
is to have the destination jam the relay while it is receiving
data from the source. This intentional interference can then be
subtracted out by the destination from the signal it receives
via the relay.
In [133], the authors considered the joint source/relay
beamforming design problem for secrecy rate maximization,
through a one-way untrusted MIMO relay. For the two-way
untrusted relay case, [134] proposes an iterative algorithm
to solve for the joint beamformer optimization problem,
and [135] considers joint optimization for beamformer and
untrusted relay node selection. In realistic fading channels,
the secrecy outage probability (SOP) is more meaningful
compared with the ergodic secrecy rate, which is ill-defined
under finite delay constraints. Thus [136] focuses on the
secrecy outage probability of the AF relaying protocol, which
is chosen due to its increased security vis-a`-vis decode-
and-forward relaying and its lower complexity compared to
compress-and-forward approaches. As in Secs. II-B and III,
the SOP indicates the fraction of fading realizations where
a secrecy rate R can be supported, and provides a security
metric when the source and destination have no CSI for the
eavesdropper. The secrecy rate performance of untrusted relay
selection was examined in [137]. In [138], a constant BER of
0.5 is maintained at the untrusted relay by revealing to it only
the real or imaginary components of the confidential M -ary
symbols.
B. Trusted Relays and Helpers
Unlike the aforementioned case, in a trusted relay scenario
the eavesdroppers and relays are separate network entities.
Some of the most commonly encountered relay-based wiretap
scenarios and corresponding solutions are depicted in Fig. 6.
The relays can play various roles to counteract external
eavesdroppers. They may act purely as traditional relays while
utilizing help from other nodes to ensure security; they may
also act as both relaying components as well as cooperative
jamming partners to enhance the secure transmission; or they
can assume the role of stand-alone helpers to facilitate the
jamming of unintended receivers.
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A typical model of a relay channel with an external eaves-
dropper was investigated by Lai et al. in [139], where outer-
bounds on the optimal rate-equivocation region are derived
assuming a classical decode-and-forward protocol. The authors
of [139] also propose a novel noise-forwarding strategy where
the full-duplex relay sends dummy codewords independent of
the secret message in order to confuse the eavesdropper. Such
a strategy is also referred to as ‘deaf cooperation’ in [140],
[141].
In [143], [144], several cooperative schemes are proposed
for a two-hop multiple-relay network, and the corresponding
relay weights are derived to maximize the achievable secrecy
rate, under the constraint that the link between the source and
the relay is not protected from eavesdropping. The secrecy
scaling laws in the limit of a large number of nodes for
such a scenario are analyzed in [145]. The extension to a
scenario with multiple eavesdroppers and maximum secrecy
rate beamforming was pursued in [146]. It was shown in [147]
that the decode-and-forward strategy is always outperformed
by randomize-and-forward relaying (source and relay use
different codebooks) in terms of secrecy outage probability.
[147] also discusses where to ideally place the relay. In
[148], optimal precoding matrices based on artificial noise
alignment are designed for a MIMO relay channel where the
source, relay, and destination cooperatively jam an external
eavesdropper, while robust relay beamforming was considered
in [149]. A combination of source GSVD precoding and
relay SVD precoding was adopted in [150] for the MIMO
relay wiretap channel. A relay-assisted OFDMA downlink was
considered in [151], where the base station and relays jointly
optimize the resource allocation for artificial noise versus data.
Secrecy rate regions for a generalized relay network with
parallel channels between all four terminals are derived in
[152]. In [153], the set of relays is optimally divided into actual
AF or DF relays and cooperative jammers, under an imperfect
CSI assumption. Relay selection is another important issue
when multiple relays are available; the optimal selection policy
assuming the DF protocol was provided in [154] and shown
to be superior to conventional max-min relay selection, while
an opportunistic relay selection scheme was shown to have
vanishing secrecy outage probability as the number of DF
relays grew in [155]. A more general scenario was considered
in [156] for AF and DF relays, with single and multiple relay
selection schemes and corresponding diversity orders being
presented. [157] considered utilizing a buffer-aided relay to
enhance both transmission efficiency and security for two-hop
relay networks.
Helpers serve as friendly jammers that do not have any
information of their own to transmit, but instead cooperate
with authorized nodes to degrade the signals intercepted by
eavesdroppers. Namely, a helper can send a random codeword
at a rate that ensures that it can be decoded and subtracted
from the received signal by the intended receiver, but cannot
be decoded by the eavesdropper. Alternatively, a helper can
transmit a jamming signal that interferes with the ability of
the eavesdropper to intercept and decode the desired signal.
For example, in a single-antenna wiretap channel with external
helpers, an interesting approach is to split the transmission
Nr
Ne
Na Nb
Ph
as
e 1
Phase 2
Alice
Relay
Bob
Eve
Fig. 7: Two-hop MIMO network with trusted relay and external
eavesdropper.
time into two phases. In the first phase, the transmitter
and the intended receiver both transmit independent artificial
noise signals to the helper nodes. The helper nodes and
the eavesdropper receive different weighted versions of these
two signals. In the second stage, the helper nodes simply
replay a weighted version of the received signal, using a
publicly available sequence of weights. At the same time, the
transmitter transmits its secret message, while also canceling
the artificial noise at the intended receiver [41].
In [158], a wiretap channel with an independent helping
jammer was considered. The interferer can send a random
codeword at a rate that ensures that it can be decoded and
subtracted from the received signal by the intended receiver
but cannot be decoded by the eavesdropper. The optimal
helper power allocation over parallel OFDM subchannels is
derived in [159]. Optimal jamming weights and positions for
helpers with mobility are presented in [160]. The effect of CSI
feedback delay on relay and helper selection was quantified
in [161]. In [162], a MISO scenario with constrained limited
feedback of CSI from the receiver was considered, and an
adaptive bit-allocation policy was proposed to optimally divide
feedback bits between the transmitter and helper channels.
The full MIMO scenario with artificial noise jamming by
a single multi-antenna helper was analyzed in [163]. The
jamming strategy of a multi-antenna helper powered by energy
harvesting instead of a regular battery was optimized in [164].
For the proposed coordinated cooperative jamming scheme
for MIMO ad hoc networks in [165], when one pair of nodes
are communicating with each other, all the nodes surrounding
the legitimate receiver cooperate to interfere with the eaves-
dropper by sending jamming signals. Orthogonal information
subspaces and jamming subspaces are broadcast across the
network, and artificial noise is chosen to lie in the publicized
jamming subspace such that there will be no interference at
the destination when an appropriate receive beamformer is
used. An uncoordinated cooperative jamming strategy is also
proposed for the case where the public jamming subspace is
unavailable. In this case, the AN is simply the right singular
vector of the main channel corresponding to the smallest
singular value. Both schemes have been shown to efficiently
increase the secrecy capacity, even if the eavesdropper has
knowledge of the associated subspaces. The authors of [166]
considered a MISO channel with and without an external
helper, and obtained robust beamforming/jamming solutions
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via numerical methods for imperfect CSI scenarios.
A more general case where cooperative jamming strategies
guarantee secure communication in both hops without the need
for external helpers was studied in [167]. In these approaches,
the normally inactive nodes in the relay network can be used
as cooperative jamming sources to confuse the eavesdropper
and provide better performance in terms of secrecy rate. In
the proposed cooperative jamming strategies, the source and
the destination nodes act as temporary helpers to transmit
jamming signals during transmission phases in which they
are normally inactive. In [168], the source transmits artificial
noise along with data in the first hop, in addition to jamming
by the destination. Jamming by the destination for the special
case of a single-hop system was examined in [169], [170],
which is feasible only when the destination has full-duplex
capabilities, i.e., it can transmit and receive simultaneously on
the same frequency with the aid of self-interference cance-
lation methods. Returning to [167], two types of cooperative
jamming schemes may be defined, full cooperative jamming
(FCJ) and partial cooperative jamming (PCJ), depending on
whether or not both the transmitter and the temporary helper
transmit jamming signals at the same time. A comparison of
these schemes is shown in Fig. 8.
30 35 40 45 50
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
Global Transmit Power [dBm]
Se
cr
ec
y 
Ra
te
 [b
ps
/H
z]
 
 
FCJ
FCJ Individual PA
PCJ
w/o Jamming
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cooperative jamming, ECSIT unknown, four antennas at all nodes.
In [111], [112], a two-way wiretap channel was considered,
in which both the source and receiver transmit information
over the channel to each other in the presence of a wiretapper.
Achievable rates for the two-way Gaussian channel are de-
rived. In addition, a cooperative jamming scheme that utilizes
the potential jammers was shown to be able to further increase
the secrecy sum rate. [171] showed that using feedback for
encoding is essential in Gaussian full-duplex two-way wiretap
channels, while feedback can be ignored in the Gaussian half-
duplex two-way relay channel with untrusted relays. More
recently, secure transmission strategies are studied for the
multi-antenna two-way relay channel with network coding
in the presence of eavesdroppers [172]-[175]. By applying
the analog network-coded relaying protocol, the end nodes
exchange messages in two time slots. In this scenario, the
eavesdropper has a significant advantage since it obtains two
observations of the transmitted data compared to a single
observation at each of the end nodes. As a countermeasure, in
each of the two communication phases the transmitting nodes
jam the eavesdropper, either by optimally using any available
spatial degrees of freedom, or with the aid of external helpers.
VI. WIRELESS SECRET KEY AGREEMENT
We recall that the original secure communication system
studied by Shannon was based on secret-key encryption.
Shannon’s result that perfect secrecy required encryption with
a random one-time pad cipher at least as long as the message
was widely regarded as a pessimistic result, until it was
reexamined in the context of noisy channels by Maurer [21].
In his seminal work, Maurer decried Wyner’s degraded wiretap
channel as being too unrealistic, and instead proposed a secret-
key agreement protocol that could be implemented over a
noiseless but authenticated and publicly observable two-way
channel in the presence of a passive eavesdropper.
The key elements of Maurer’s strategy are the information
reconciliation and privacy amplification procedures. The infor-
mation reconciliation phase is aimed at generating an identical
random sequence between Alice and Bob by exploiting a
public discussion channel (sometimes split into a separate
randomness sharing step). The privacy amplification stage
extracts a secret key from the identical random sequence
agreed to by two terminals in the preceding information
reconciliation phase. In other words, after public discussion
based on correlated randomness in the first stage, privacy
amplification reduces an initial piece of random nature into a
smaller entity (e.g., by linear mapping and universal hashing)
which is known only by the legitimate users, even if the
eavesdropper has a less noisy channel in certain cases.
PX,Y,Z
Eve
Alice
Z
X Y
Bob
Public channel
Fig. 9: Secret key agreement by t rounds of public discussion
between Alice and Bob. X and Y comprise the source of common
randomness; Eve has access to Z and joint distribution PX,Y,Z .
More precisely, it was assumed that the transmitter, receiver
and adversary have access to repeated independent realizations
of random variables X,Y, and Z , respectively, with some
globally-known joint probability distribution PX,Y,Z as in
Fig. 9. The eavesdropper is completely ignorant of X and
Y . Alice and Bob undergo multiple rounds of two-way com-
munication over the public channel, followed by generation
of a shared key based on their individual information and
12
observed messages. The secret-key rate S(X ;Y ||Z) between
X and Y with respect to Z is then defined as the maximal
rate at which Alice and Bob can generate a secret key over
the noiseless public channel in such a way that the adversary
obtains information about this key only at an arbitrarily small
rate (cf. (5)). The following upper and lower bounds on the
secret key rate were presented in [21]:
S (X ;Y ||Z) ≤ min [I (X ;Y ) , I (X ;Y |Z)] , (13)
S (X ;Y ||Z) ≥ max [I (X ;Y )− I (X ;Z) , I (Y ;X)− I (Y ;Z)] .
Closely related results were offered in the concurrent work
by Ahlswede and Csiza´r [176]. Csisza´r and Narayan studied
the augmentation of key-based secrecy capacity with the aid
of a helper which supplies additional correlated information in
[177], and obtained a single-letter characterization of the key-
based secrecy capacities with an arbitrary number of terminals
in [178]. Maurer and Wolf subsequently extended the secret-
key sharing analysis of [21] to account for the presence
of an active eavesdropper in [179]-[181], and showed that
either a secret key can be generated at the same rate as in
the passive-adversary case, or such secret-key agreement is
infeasible. Refinements to their model that yield larger key
rates are shown in [182]. A two-user interference channel
with a noiseless, shared feedback channel from the receivers
and corresponding bounds on the secret-key capacity region
are studied in [183], while the multiple-access channel was
examined in [184].
The next evolution in secret-key sharing was the exploitation
of the common randomness inherent in reciprocal wireless
communication channels. Koorapaty et al. relied on the in-
dependence of the channels between transmitter/receiver and
transmitter/eavesdropper to use the phase of the fading coef-
ficients as a secret key [185]. Other techniques include key
generation via
• discretizing extracted coefficients of the multipath com-
ponents [186],
• quantizing the channel phases for a multitone communi-
cation system such that multiple independent phases are
used to generate longer keys [187],
• directly quantizing the complex channel coefficients
[188],
• a purposely constructed random variable whose realiza-
tions are communicated between the legitimate nodes,
with secrecy achieved when the eavesdropper lacks chan-
nel state information [189],
• exploiting the level crossing rates of the fading processes
at the legitimate terminals [190],
• inducing more rapid fluctuations in channels from which
keys are to be extracted via transmit array optimization
[191],
• utilization of channel estimates as correlated random
variables for information reconciliation [192],
• utilizing appropriately timed one-bit feedback available
in practical networks due to Automatic Repeat reQuest
(ARQ) protocols [193],
• using unknown deterministic parameters such as wide-
band multipath channel parameters that are estimated by
both Alice and Bob [194]. This is a departure from the
common randomness framework of Maurer, and a new
notion of intrinsic information is defined accordingly to
quantify achievable secret-key lengths.
Not surprisingly, multiple-antenna channels have attracted
considerable attention for their capabilities of increasing com-
mon randomness at the legitimate users. The MIMO secret-
key capacity for Gaussian inputs and system model identical
to that of (6) is [195]
CSK = max
Qx0
log det
(
I+HxQxH
H
x
)
− log det
(
I+HeQxH
H
e
)
.
(14)
where HHx Hx = HHb Hb +HHe He is an equivalent channel.
Note the similarity to (8), based on which a similar GSVD-
based transmission scheme was adopted in [195]. Li and
Ratazzi [196] designed a randomized beamforming scheme
based on knowledge of the main channel that makes blind
channel estimation by the eavesdropper more difficult; the
keyless secrecy rate of this method was examined in [197].
Chen and Jensen developed practical key generation protocols
for MIMO systems with temporally and spatially correlated
channel coefficients in [198], [199]. Some of the first exper-
imental measurement campaigns on secret key generation in
reciprocal MIMO channels are presented in [200], [201].
Previously discussed techniques for keyless security can
be reutilized to enhance secret-key rates. The cooperative
jamming method of [111] was used in [202] as a precursor
to secret key establishment over a two-way wiretap channel,
and artificial noise was used to enhance secret key rates
in a two-way relay network in [203]. From the adversary’s
perspective, the optimality of Gaussian jamming against secret
key establishment in two-way wireless channels was given
in [204]. The role of a feedback channel in improving the
secrecy rate of a wiretap channel has also been revisited in
recent work. For a modulo-additive channel [205], the authors
showed that a noisy feedback channel that is observable by all
parties can still be utilized to generate a secrecy rate equal to
the main channel capacity, since the feedback from the (either
full- or half-duplex) receiver acts as a private key that jams
the eavesdropper. Ardestanizadeh et al. [206] considered a
secure but rate-limited feedback channel, and proved that it
is optimal for the receiver to feedback a random secret key
that is independent of its received channel output symbols.
VII. CODE DESIGN FOR SECRECY
A. Channel Coding
Much like conventional networks, error correction codes
play an integral role in building “real-world” secure systems.
The McEliece cryptosystem [207], [208] devised in 1978 can
now be seen to be a bridge between channel coding-based
physical layer security and classical cryptography. In this
setup, the size-(k × n) generator matrix of a (n, k) Goppa
(linear) code capable of correcting t errors is multiplied from
the left and right by a randomly generated non-singular matrix
and permutation matrix respectively, and the size-(k × n)
product is made available as a public key. Messages sent
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to this entity are generated using the public key and then
perturbed by a random vector of Hamming weight t. The
ciphertext is decoded by multiplications with the inverses of
the permutation and non-singular matrices interspersed with
the code decoding algorithm.
Once the groundwork had been laid for the foundations
of information-theoretic security [cf. Sec. II-B], several re-
searchers turned their attention to the development of practical
secrecy-preserving channel codes. Wyner [17] and Csisza`r and
Ko¨rner [25] had used a stochastic coding argument to provide
a non-constructive proof of the existence of channel codes
that guarantee both robustness to transmission errors and a
prescribed degree of data confidentiality as the block length
tends to infinity.
In Wyner’s stochastic encoding scheme, a mother codebook
C0(n) of length n is randomly partitioned into “secret bins” or
subcodes {C1(n), C2(n), . . . , CM (n)}. A message w is asso-
ciated with a sub-code Cw(n) and the transmitted codeword
is randomly selected within the sub-code. The mother code
C0(n) provides enough redundancy so that the legitimate re-
ceiver can decode the message reliably, whereas each sub-code
is sufficiently large and, hence, introduces enough randomness
so that the eavesdropper’s uncertainty about the transmitted
message can be guaranteed. However, the development of
practical wiretap codes for general wiretap channels was not
as rapid as that of classical error-correction codes in the two
decades following Wyner’s work.
Therefore, it was natural to turn to known capacity-
achieving channel codes and examine their applications for
secrecy [209]. In [210], Thangaraj et al. advanced the idea
of using graph-based codes such as low density parity check
(LDPC) codes for binary erasure wiretap channels (noiseless
main channel), and showed that both reliability and Wyner’s
weak secrecy criterion could be satisfied simultaneously. Bloch
and coauthors [189] adopted LDPC codes and multi-level
coding for the information reconciliation phase of a practical
secret key agreement protocol. For Gaussian wiretap channels,
appropriately punctured LDPC codes were employed with the
relative bit error rate at the receiver and eavesdropper as a
proxy security metric in [211], where the authors showed that
a ‘security gap’ was achievable. A turbo code-based scheme
with the puncturing pattern determined by a pre-shared secret
key was presented in [212], while the achievability of high
equivocation rates (cf. (2)) with random puncturing was shown
in [213].
Graph-based unstructured codes are not the only viable
approach for wiretap coding. He and Yener [214] showed that
an arbitrarily large secrecy rate is achievable for Gaussian
wiretap channels with an external helper using structured
integer and nested lattice codes. Nested lattice codes were also
deployed over the binary symmetric wiretap channel in [215].
Arora and Sang presented the notion of dialog codes wherein
the receiver aids the transmitter by jamming the eavesdropper
while still being able to recover the transmitted symbol [216].
If the receiver is half-duplex, then this can be achieved using
a rate-1/2 code with memory where the receiver jams either
of the code bits but is able to recover the message from the
remaining bit, whereas the equivocation at the eavesdropper
is unity. The recently proposed polar coding scheme has been
shown to achieve the secrecy capacity for binary symmetric
and deterministic wiretap channels [217], [218]. Polar coding
was subsequently extended to secret-key generation in [219],
and shown to be secret-key capacity-achieving for a binary
symmetric channel.
B. Distributed Storage Coding
A recent avenue for coding theory research is the design of
resilient codes for distributed data and cloud storage systems.
The essence of such systems is that chunks of data files are
scattered across various storage nodes, and it is desired that an
end-user or data collector be able to accurately reconstruct the
original files by retrieving data from a subset of k such storage
nodes. However, the storage nodes are assumed to be unreli-
able and prone to failure (equivalent to data erasures), and thus
fault-tolerance to such failures under bandwidth constraints is
the primary code design criterion. These considerations lead to
the introduction of a new class of ‘regenerating codes’ which
are efficient with respect to both storage space utilization and
the amount of data downloaded for repair (termed repair-
bandwidth) [224]. In addition to reliability, it is also critical
to protect data from being reconstructed by eavesdroppers.
A passive eavesdropper that can access the data on up to ℓ
storage nodes is denoted a Type-I adversary in [221], and as
a Type-II adversary if it can also observe the repair data of ℓ
nodes. A typical security scenario is shown in Fig. 10, where
ℓ = 2 out of k = 4 storage nodes have been compromised by
an eavesdropper that seeks to reconstruct the original file F .
Data Collector
F+K
DC
F
Source Node 
F+K
F+5K
F+3K
F-4K
Storage Node 2
Storage Node 1 (failed)
Storage Node 3
Storage Node 4 (compromised)
Repaired Node 1
(compromised)
Fig. 10: Security problem in distributed storage network with an
eavesdropper that can observe data in compromised nodes.
Pawar et al. studied the problem of securing distributed
storage systems against eavesdroppers and malicious adver-
saries in [222], and defined the secrecy capacity Cs (α, γ)
as the maximum amount of data that can be stored in the
system such that the data can be reconstructed reliably while
remaining perfectly secret from Eve, for all possible data
collectors and eavesdroppers. Their upper bound on the system
secrecy capacity for a Type-I adversary turned out to be
Cs (α, γ) ≤
k∑
i=ℓ+1
min
{
(d− i+ 1)
γ
d
, α
}
where α is the storage capacity in symbols of each of the
k total nodes, and γ is the total amount of data downloaded
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for repair by the replacement node from d unaffected storage
nodes. The bound verifies the intuition that only the k− l non-
compromised nodes can yield secure and reliable information
to the data collector. Shah et al. constructed secure exact
repair codes based on the product-matrix framework in [223],
which ensures that the information contained in the symbols
downloaded by the replacement node is independent of the
identities of the helper nodes. Dikaliotis et al. studied the
security of distributed storage systems in the presence of a
trusted verifier [224]. The maximum file size that can be stored
securely was determined for systems in which all the available
nodes help with repair in [225]. The single node repair setting
was generalized to multiple node failures and secrecy capacity
bounds provided for the same in [226]. The characterization
of the secure storage-vs-exact-repair-bandwidth tradeoff region
under both Type-I and Type-II attacks was given in [221]. For
a heterogeneous system with nodes having different storage
capacities and different repair bandwidths, lower and upper
bounds on the system capacity were given in [227].
C. Network Coding
While the emerging area of network coding is not directly
related to traditional channel coding design per se, we briefly
mention physical layer security issues encountered in this field.
Network coding is a paradigm for multi-hop wireline and wire-
less networks that allows intermediate nodes to ‘mix’ packets
or signals received from multiple paths, with the objective
of improving throughput [228]. Therefore, such networks are
vulnerable to eavesdropping, akin to other networks discussed
thus far in this work.
The secure network coding problem was introduced in [229]
for multicast wireline networks where each link has equal
capacity, and a wiretapper can observe an unknown set of up to
k network links. For this scenario, the secrecy capacity is given
by the cut-set bound, and is achieved by injecting k random
keys at the source which are decoded at the sink along with
the message [229], [230]. Silva and Kschischang [231] among
others have drawn connections between the multicast problem
and the type-II wiretap channel studied by Ozarow and Wyner,
as described in Section II-B. Eavesdropping countermeasures
for wireless network coding systems are described in [172],
[232], among others. In [173], a distributed version of the
randomized transmission scheme of [196] was adopted for a
cooperative network coding system with external eavesdrop-
pers, with bit error rate as the performance metric.
VIII. RELATED TOPICS
A. Game Theory and Security
The interactions between various agents (transmitters, re-
ceivers, helpers, and attackers) in multiuser wireless networks
are accurately captured by inter-disciplinary analyses based
on game theory and microeconomics, and this holds true
for problems of secrecy as well. The central tenet of game
theory is to model agents or players as rational entities whose
sole focus is to maximize their individual gains or payoff
functions. A non-cooperative game model assumes agents
eschew coordination with one another (e.g., in a 2-player zero-
sum game the payoffs add up to zero), while in a cooperative
game players may choose to cooperate to achieve some mutual
benefit (e.g., players may offer monetary payments via an
auction, or form a coalition). Stable outcomes from which
no player has an incentive to deviate are known as Nash
Equilibria.
A zero-sum game between a multi-channel transmitter and
an adversarial nature in the presence of an eavesdropper was
treated in [233], with the difference of Alice and Eve’s SINR
as the payoff. Utilizing secrecy rate as the payoff in a game-
theoretic formulation is a relatively new concept. Yuksel, Liu,
and Erkip studied a SISO wiretap network with an adversarial
jammer helping the eavesdropper as a zero-sum game, and
presented the Nash Equilibrium input and jammer cumulative
distribution functions [234]. In [235], [236], the authors con-
sidered a MIMO wiretap channel with an active eavesdropper
that can either listen or jam, and pose its interactions with
the transmitter as a zero-sum game with the MIMO secrecy
rate as the payoff function. The SISO one-sided interference
channel was studied in [237], and the corresponding Nash
equilibrium secrecy rate region was derived. A zero-sum
power allocation game between a multi-channel transmitter
and a hostile jammer that is distinct from the eavesdropper
was formulated in [238], with the secrecy rate as the payoff
function.
Cooperative game theory was applied in [239] to demon-
strate the improvement in secrecy capacity of an ad hoc
network, when users form coalitions to null the signals over-
heard by eavesdroppers via collaborative beamforming. For a
hierarchical multi-hop system with different potential paths
to the base station, a distributed tree formation game was
postulated in [240]. Han et al. [241] developed a two-stage
Stackelberg game where a transmitter ‘pays’ a number of
external helpers to jam an eavesdropper, and computed the
corresponding equilibrium prices and convergence properties.
The same authors examined a similar scenario in [242], where
an auction game was used instead to model the transactions
between transmitters and helping jammers. Anand and Chan-
dramouli studied an M -user non-cooperative power control
game with secrecy considerations in [243], and applied pricing
functions to improve the energy efficiency and sum secrecy
capacity of the network. For the 2-user IC with confiden-
tial messages, we have discussed in Sec. IV-B how Kalai-
Smorodinsky bargaining solutions and zero-sum games are
adopted to allow the transmitters to find an operating point
that balances network performance and fairness [124], [126].
In [244], game theory is used by multiple eavesdroppers to
decide whether to collude or not in a MISO wiretap channel.
B. Cognitive Radio and Sensor Networks
As a promising technique to alleviate spectrum scarcity,
cognitive radio (CR) [245] is capable of dynamically sensing
and locating unused spectrum segments in a target spectrum
pool and communicating using the unused spectrum segments
in ways that cause no harmful interference to the primary
users of the spectrum. Due to the vulnerability of CR phys-
ical layer spectrum sensing, research attention on physical
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layer security issues, though limited, has emerged recently.
In [246], [247], several classes of physical layer attacks for
dynamic spectrum access and adaptive radio scenarios are
described, and corresponding techniques to mitigate these
attacks are proposed. Denial-of-service vulnerabilities from
the perspectives of the network architecture employed, the
spectrum access technique used and the spectrum awareness
model assumed, are examined in [248] and possible remedies
are provided. Achievable secrecy rates in CR networks with
external eavesdroppers have been studied in [249], [250].
Network spectral efficiencies can be further improved if the
cooperative jamming signals are data signals instead of indis-
criminate artificial noise. An elegant example of such a system
is a CR network where the primary user wishes to conceal its
message from an external eavesdropper [251], [252]. Here, the
role of helpers is played by secondary or unlicensed users that
seek to opportunistically transmit their data in the frequency
band occupied by the primary user. Since the eavesdropper
is interested only in the primary message, the secondary user
signals act as jamming signals at the eavesdropper (as well as
the primary receiver). The primary signal in turn is perceived
as interference at the secondary receivers. Therefore, it is
critical to judiciously select the primary and secondary signal
powers in tandem so as to maximize the joint rate region
of the cooperating users. In [251], [252], this was achieved
via a Stackelberg power-control game formulation for the
primary-secondary interactions, where the primary user allows
secondary transmissions only if its secrecy rate is improved by
doing so. In the multi-channel scenario of [253], the primary
users are oblivious to the presence of CRs, while a game-
theoretic formulation was constructed for optimal channel
selection by the CRs and external eavesdroppers.
While not directly related to information security, a so-
called primary user emulation (PUE) threat to spectrum
sensing was identified in [254]. In PUE, a malicious node
mimics the signal characteristics of licensed users in order
to mislead cognitive radios into vacating the spectrum. As
a countermeasure, [254] proposed a transmitter verification
scheme to verify whether a given signal is that of an incumbent
transmitter by estimating its location and observing its signal
characteristics. Another major physical-layer vulnerability in
cooperative spectrum-sensing CR systems is the deliberate
feedback of false sensing information. In [255], this problem
is solved by designing fusion center (FC) counting rules so
as to minimize the overall false alarm probability. Details of
security challenges peculiar to cognitive radio networks can
be found in [247].
Wireless sensor networks and corresponding distributed
estimation algorithms have been at the forefront of signal
processing research in the past decade. The downlink and
uplink phases of communication between the sensors and the
FC are inherently vulnerable to eavesdropping. Li, Chen, and
Ratazzi [256] tackled downlink secrecy when the FC has
multiple antennas by deliberately inducing rapid time-varying
fluctuations in the eavesdropper’s channel. [257] proposed the
use of artificial noise-like schemes on the uplink to ‘confuse’
eavesdroppers about the aggregate sensor observations sent to
the FC. In [258], the sensor observations are randomly mapped
to a set of discrete quantization levels, with the corresponding
mapping probabilities known only to the intended FC and
not the eavesdropper. The optimal mapping probabilities and
FC decision rule that jointly minimize its error probability
subject to a constraint on the eavesdropper error probability
are then derived. Marano et al. [259] examined optimal sensor
censoring strategies in an energy-constrained sensor network
infiltrated by an eavesdropper. Kundur et al. examined cross-
layer secrecy-preserving design methodologies for multimedia
sensor networks in [260].
C. Secrecy in Large-Scale Networks
Unlike point-to-point scenarios, the communication between
nodes in large-scale networks strongly depends on the location
and the interactions between nodes. In an early work on
eavesdropping in cellular CDMA networks with multi-user de-
tection capabilities, the outage probability of the eavesdropper
signal-to-interference ratio was adopted as the performance
metric [261]. Based on the assumption that legitimate nodes
and eavesdroppers are distributed randomly in space, studies
on secure communications for large-scale wireless networks
have been carried out recently, utilizing tools from stochastic
geometry and graph theory. Analyses based on stochastic
geometry typically assume a spatial point process model (e.g.,
Poisson) for the locations of transmitters and receivers.
Secrecy communication graphs describing secure connec-
tivity over a large-scale network with eavesdroppers present
were investigated in [262]-[264]. In particular, the statistical
characterizations of in-degree and out-degree under the secu-
rity constraints were considered by Haenggi [262], Pinto et al.
[263] and Goel et al. [265]. By using tools from percolation
theory, the existence of a secrecy graph was analyzed in [262],
[265]. The results in [264] showed improvements in secure
connectivity by introducing directional antenna elements and
eigen-beamforming. In order to derive the network throughput,
these works on connectivity were further extended to incor-
porate secrecy capacity analysis. Specifically, the maximum
achievable secrecy rate under the worst-case scenario with
colluding eavesdroppers was given in [267]. Scaling laws for
secrecy capacity in large networks have been investigated
in [268]-[270]. Focusing on the transmission capacity of
secure communications (defined as the number of successful
transmissions taking place in the network per unit area, subject
to a constraint on secrecy outage probability), the throughput
cost of achieving a certain level of security in an interference-
limited network was analyzed in [271], and the impact of
uncertainties in node positions and CSI was examined in [272].
The probability of secure connectivity was given in [273]
for multi-antenna nodes, and in [274] for a scenario with
randomize-and-forward relays and a PPP for eavesdropper
locations. A hierarchical multi-level sensor network was con-
sidered in [275], which introduced the concept of distributed
network secrecy throughput to quantify inter-level network
secrecy of all levels, i.e., data transmitted without collision are
received successfully without being successfully eavesdropped
in all levels.
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D. Physical Layer Authentication
The most critical aspect of physical layer security is to
ensure that confidential messages are decoded only by their
intended receivers. A less well-studied but necessary com-
ponent is that of message authentication, namely, to enable
the receiver of a message to detect whether it was forged
or illegitimately modified by someone other than its claimed
source. Much like secure encoding, these operations are usu-
ally performed at the network and higher layers, with recent
interest in devising physical layer counterparts.
In [276] an information-theoretic analysis of authentication
is provided assuming both that the legitimate transmitter and
receiver share a secret key and that transmission among
all parties (including the attacker) are noiseless. In [277]
both legitimate distortions of the message and joint typicality
decoding are introduced in this framework. The impact of both
noise and errors in the channel was taken into account for
the first time in [278]. There, information theoretic bounds
on the probability of a successful attack were derived for an
arbitrarily low false alarm rate and infinitely long codewords.
Current attempts at using physical layer characteristics as
authentication keys for the message source follow various
approaches. One possibility is to assume a pre-shared secret
key hidden in the modulation scheme, which is detected
by the receiver [279], [280]. In other keyless transmitter-
based methods (referred to as wireless fingerprinting), device-
specific non-ideal transmission parameters are extracted from
the received signal. They are identified as characteristics of the
claimed source and then compared with those from previous
authenticated messages [281]. Channel-based authentication
algorithms compare the channel response estimated from the
current message with that estimated from the previous trans-
missions by the ostensibly verified source, in effect authenti-
cating the position of the transmitter rather than its identity. In
order to reliably distinguish channels from different locations,
some source of diversity must be exploited, either in the
spatial domain by measurements of the received power levels
at many receivers [282]-[284] or in the frequency domain via
wideband channel estimates [285]-[288]. Instead of explicitly
using channel responses for authentication, Tugnait [289]
distinguishes between message sources based on their power
spectral densities. A summary of a wide range of possible
methods is available in [290].
For the case of a multi-antenna channel, [291] considers an
approach where the test is performed in two phases. In the
first phase, the receiver gets an authenticated noisy estimate
x of the channel with respect to the legitimate transmitter. In
the second phase, upon reception of a message, the receiver
gets a new estimate u of the channel and compares it with
x. A hypothesis test is subsequently performed to determine
whether u is an estimate of the legitimate channel or the
channel forged by an eavesdropper.
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS
This paper has provided a comprehensive survey of the
field of physical layer security in wireless networks based
on information-theoretic principles. We commenced with an
overview of the foundations dating back to the pioneering
work of Shannon, Wyner, and Maurer on information-theoretic
security. We then described the evolution of secure trans-
mission strategies from point-to-point channels to multiple-
antenna systems, followed by generalizations to larger mul-
tiuser networks. We also reviewed secret-key establishment
protocols based on physical layer mechanisms, along with an
overview of practical secrecy-preserving code design and inter-
disciplinary approaches for security. The associated problem
of physical layer message authentication is also introduced.
Broadly speaking, it was observed that physical layer security
is achieved by either exploiting the independence of wireless
channels and background noise conditions observed by differ-
ent nodes, or by judiciously directing interference (exogenous
or intentional) towards unintended receivers.
The scope for future work in this field is extensive and
only a few select directions are discussed next. As an ex-
ample, the application of physical layer security techniques to
commercially deployed wireless systems is largely unexplored.
The majority of the techniques discussed in this survey,
such as artificial noise for eavesdropper jamming and CSI-
based precoding to optimize secrecy rates, are agnostic to
the underlying air interface (time/code/orthogonal frequency-
division multiple access). For example, an OFDMA-based
base station may choose to transmit artificial noise along
with data symbols in certain subcarriers as long as spectral
emission masks are not violated. A CDMA transmitter may
do the same after spreading the data with a pseudo-noise
sequence. Furthermore, in 3GPP LTE, the introduction of
Demodulation Reference Symbols (DMRS) has enabled the
use of arbitrary MIMO precoders by the base station, therefore
the secure GSVD precoder of [42] or its variants can be
implemented without change in the current LTE standard.
The secret-key generation scheme in [292] that makes use of
LTE precoding matrix indicator (PMI) feedback is therefore a
starting point for this direction. Arbitrary MIMO precoding
is also allowed in IEEE 802.11ac and other forthcoming
WLAN standards. The introduction of relay nodes, machine-
type communications, and device-to-device communications
in LTE raise new security challenges [293], and conceivably
heighten the need for combining physical layer security with
existing key-based ciphers.
Indeed, since physical layer security issues arise in mul-
tiuser systems of any kind, it is expected that new network
scenarios and corresponding security schemes will continue to
be developed. For instance, massive MIMO systems, overlay
cognitive radio networks, smart grid systems [294], networks
with simultaneous wireless information and power transfer
[295], and heterogeneous networks [296] are untapped case
studies from a secrecy perspective, to name just a few. Holistic
approaches spanning the application and physical layer, in
addition to exploitation of reconfigurable antennas [297], are
expected to become more prominent. It is evident that the use
cases of physical layer security extend well beyond cellular
systems as seen in this survey.
Another untapped area is cross-layer analysis of secrecy
combined with considerations of data queueing delay and rate
control. In conventional network control problems, data pack-
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ets that need to be served arrive in a queue(s) following some
stochastic process, and the system is considered stable if the
queue lengths are confined to some finite length. Initial steps to
incorporate secrecy constraints into such problems were taken
in [298] for a broadcast channel with confidential messages,
where a secrecy throughput-optimal scheduling scheme was
provided under a network utility maximization framework.
More recently, for a single-user scenario the authors of [299]
maximized the long-term data admission rate, subject to the
stability of the data queue as well as a bound on the rate of
secrecy outage. Evidently, many additional network scenarios
await further analysis.
Finally, a deeper understanding of the interplay between
physical layer security and classic cryptographic security is
another rich but unexplored resource for further study [300],
[301]. Also of current interest are secure transmission schemes
where the confidential message also remains covert, i.e.,
potential eavesdroppers are uncertain if transmissions are on-
going [302], [303].
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